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ABSTRACT

Just Between You and Me:
Private Financial Transactions Signal Communal Traits and Enhance Others’ Willingness to
Cooperate
by
Lennay Marie Chapman

Advisor: Ana Valenzuela, Ph.D.

Increasingly, consumers’ everyday interactions are facilitated by online platforms. One notable
feature of many online platforms is that they give consumers the ability to interact privately or
publicly. Interacting publicly (e.g., by sending a public payment) can reveal private information
pertaining to two or more consumers; this is known as co-owned information. The present work
examines disclosure decisions about co-owned information in the context of peer-to-peer
financial transactions. We propose that choosing a private mode of transacting represents a
socially mindful behavior, as it considers partners’ preferences and preserves their future ability
to keep private or disclose the transaction details. Partners, recognizing private payment as a
considerate behavior, infer private (vs. public) payment initiators to possess stronger communal
traits, and expect that they will be more likely to cooperate. On the basis of these inferences,
partners themselves become more likely to cooperate. We also provide evidence that consumers
use the decision to transact privately to signal their own communal orientation, expecting it may
encourage cooperation in others. Eight experimental studies conducted in both Europe and the
United States support these propositions.
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Contribution Statement

Increasingly, consumers’ everyday interactions are facilitated by online platforms. Many online
platforms give consumers the ability to interact in a private or public manner. For example,
consumers using Venmo for payment can transact privately (so payment is visible only to the
sender and recipient) or publicly (so payment is visible to anyone using the platform). In
choosing private or public interaction modes, consumers influence the disclosure of information
which pertains to the self and others; this is known as co-owned information (Petronio 2002).
Disclosure decisions about co-owned information can be made unilaterally (e.g., Wu, Moore,
and Fitzsimons 2019). We investigated unilateral disclosure decisions about co-owned
information in the context of peer-to-peer financial transactions. We posited that choosing to
transact privately reflects social mindfulness (Van Lange and Van Doesum 2015), as it is more
considerate of partners’ preferences and preserves their future ability to keep private or disclose
the transaction details. Thus, we introduce the construct of social mindfulness to the consumer
behavior literature and identify a novel, consumer-relevant operationalization of it. We highlight
the importance of choosing private transactions by showing that it improves how one is
perceived, how cooperatively one is expected to behave, and in turn, how willing others are to
cooperate. We also find evidence that consumers use the choice of transacting privately (vs.
publicly) to signal owning communal traits, which may encourage others to cooperate. This
finding adds to the literature on signaling theory by identifying a novel behavior that consumers
can use to communicate information about the self. Finally, this work highlights interpersonal
consequences of novel consumer choices enabled by online platforms. Substantively, we provide
practitioners and public policy makers with a better understanding of the downstream

consequences of online privacy choices. This may influence how privacy options get structured
and the way they are presented to consumers.

2

Introduction

Increasingly, consumers’ everyday interactions – their transmissions of money, messages,
and photographs, for example – are facilitated by online platforms. One notable feature of many
online platforms is that they provide consumers with choices regarding the privacy of their
interactions. For example, on the peer-to-peer payment platform Venmo, consumers can use the
default privacy setting, public, which makes the transaction details visible to anyone using the
platform, or they can select the private setting, which makes transaction details visible only to
the sender and recipient (Cortez 2021). In such cases, the consumer’s choice of privacy setting
determines whether their interaction with another consumer will be disclosed to others or kept
private. In the present research, we focused on consumers’ chosen privacy settings for online
transactions of money, which are facilitated by peer-to-peer (P2P) payment platforms such as
Venmo.
In recent years, P2P payment platforms have proliferated: Venmo, Bizum, and Cash App
are just a few of the platforms from which consumers can choose. P2P payment platforms are
used by millions of consumers (Rudegeair 2019) and facilitate billions of dollars’ worth of
transactions every quarter (de Best 2021). Venmo alone boasted more than 26 million monthly
users in 2019 (Curry 2020) and facilitated the transmission of $172 billion in 2018 (Shevlin
2019). Generally, P2P payment platforms facilitate transactions, which are sets of actions that
follow legal protocols, are durable (i.e., cannot be undone1), and are atomic (i.e., cannot be
partially completed) (Gray 1981). Specifically, these transactions are financial, meaning they

Venmo transactions cannot be cancelled. The platform does not reverse payments at the sender’s request. A
recipient who does not wish to receive a payment must initiate a separate transaction to return the money (Venmo,
n.d. a).
1
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constitute transfers of money that are either incoming or outgoing (Kappes, Gladstone, and
Hershfield 2021). Because financial transactions relate to one’s dealings with money, and money
is a personal topic that consumers avoid discussing (Sun and Slepian 2020), we expected that
consumers would be sensitive to having their financial transactions disclosed to others on a P2P
payment platform.
Prior to the advent of P2P payment platforms, consumers paid one another through
methods that do not offer different privacy settings (e.g., cash; personal checks). While the
privacy of cash and personal check payments could be influenced by the number of people
present at the time of a transaction, these methods do not prompt a decision about whether or not
to make a record of the transaction that will be visible to other consumers. Thus, the ability to
create an enduring, public record of one’s transactions is novel. Yet, the practice of making
transactions visible to others has gained rapid prevalence among consumers. For example, more
than 207 million transactions have been conducted publicly on the P2P payment platform,
Venmo (Whittaker 2018).
When consumers transact publicly, they reveal transaction-related details which pertain
to both the self and their partner. Because these transaction details are relevant to two or more
people, they can be considered a type of co-owned information (Petronio 2002). The term coowned refers to a sense of psychological proprietorship, which is distinct from legal ownership,
and can apply to entities that people either do or do not legally own (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks
2003). Following Petronio (2002), we used the term co-owned in reference to the psychological
ownership two people might feel vis-à-vis mutually self-relevant information.
When people co-own information, they want to be able to control whether or not it is
disclosed to others (Petronio 2002). Yet, disclosure decisions about co-owned information can be

4

made unilaterally. For example, on P2P payment platforms one person (i.e., the initiator) may
initiate a private or public transaction with another person (i.e., their partner). In so doing, the
initiator makes a unilateral disclosure decision, possibly without knowing their partner’s privacy
preferences or the potential downstream effects of their decision. To enhance understanding of
the meaning and implications of unilateral disclosure decisions, we turned to the literature on
social mindfulness.
Social mindfulness refers to considering and acting upon what others may want (Van
Lange and Van Doesum 2015). One way of demonstrating social mindfulness is by making
choices that enhance rather than limit others’ options (Van Lange and Van Doesum 2015). We
posited that when consumers choose private transactions, rather than the default setting of public,
they are demonstrating social mindfulness. This is because transacting privately affords their
partners the future ability either to keep transaction details private or disclose them to others. In
contrast, transacting publicly automatically discloses transaction-related information, thereby
leaving partners without a choice between keeping the transaction private or disclosing it.
The present research identified several important downstream implications of choosing to
transact privately. First, partners infer initiators who choose to transact privately (vs. publicly) to
possess stronger communal traits. Based on these trait inferences, partners expect that private
(vs. public) initiators will behave more cooperatively, even in a subsequent, unrelated task (e.g.,
an ultimatum game; a prisoner’s dilemma game). Equipped with the confidence that private (vs.
public) initiators will behave cooperatively, partners themselves become more likely to
cooperate. We also found evidence that consumers choose private modes of transacting to
convey their own communal standing, with the understanding that it will encourage cooperation
in others. Eight studies, including one study with real payment behavior, provided support for
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these propositions. By testing the theoretical model in Europe and the United States, both with
student and community samples, we found evidence that these effects are generalizable.
This article aims to make several contributions. First, we introduce the construct of social
mindfulness to the consumer behavior literature and identify a novel, consumer-relevant
operationalization of it: choosing privacy over disclosure in online interactions. We highlight the
importance of the construct by showing that choosing social mindfulness improves how one is
perceived, how cooperatively one is expected to behave, and how willing others are to cooperate.
The present work also contributes to the literature on signaling theory. It does so by
identifying a novel behavior (i.e., choosing privacy vs. disclosure) that consumers can use to
communicate information about the self. Consumers signal information about themselves in
myriad ways, for example by communicating one’s status through product size (Dubois, Rucker,
and Galinsky 2012), one’s motivation through smiling (Cheng, Mukhopadhyay, and Williams
2020), and one’s competence through non-conformity (Bellezza, Gino, and Keinan 2014). We
seek to augment this stream of literature by showing consumers can signal their own communal
traits by choosing private modes of transacting.
Finally, this work highlights the consequences of novel consumer behaviors that are
enabled by online platforms. Online platforms play an increasingly prominent role in modern
social life, and past work has demonstrated that features unique to online platforms can impact
decision making (Roth, Wänke, and Erev 2017), self-presentation strategies (Gil-Lopez et al.
2018) and the way consumers are perceived (Hofstetter, Rüppell, and John 2017). We contribute
to this burgeoning area of research by examining the decision to transact either publicly or
privately with another consumer, which online platforms enable and thusly can evoke
interpersonal consequences. Because the interpersonal relationships we investigated were
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consumer dyads, we add to research on dyadic consumption decisions (Dzhogleva and
Lamberton 2014; Lowe and Haws 2014; Nikolova and Lamberton 2016).
Substantively, the interpersonal consequences of transacting privately versus publicly are
crucial for consumers to understand, since financial transactions often are embedded into social
settings. Many social settings also provide opportunities for cooperation (e.g., on crowdfunding
platforms; in the metaverse; on social networking sites), and so it is important for consumers to
know how their transaction-related decisions might impact others’ cooperation propensity.
Identifying the downstream consequences of online disclosure decisions may allow
practitioners and public policy to make better-informed decisions. For example, practitioners
facilitating online social interactions may wish to prioritize private modes of interacting to
benefit participants’ cooperative relationships. Public policy makers, upon understanding how
private interactions improve interpersonal outcomes and preserve consumers’ ability to control
how their self-relevant information is disclosed, may require companies to structure
communication options differently (e.g., by offering private settings by default).

7

Conceptual Development

There is a growing stream of research in consumer behavior examining the factors that
influence self-disclosure decisions (John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2011; Melumad and Meyer
2020; Melzner, Bonezzi, and Meyvis 2021). In this body of research, self-disclosure is defined as
the communication of information about the self or the provision of self-relevant details (Cozby
1973; Kim, Barasz, and John 2021). Although disclosure often has been examined in terms of
consumers’ decisions to reveal information about the self to one other person (e.g., John et al.
2011), online platforms have created new ways of disclosing. For example, information can be
communicated with large and heterogenous audiences (Gil-Lopez et al. 2018).
Online platforms also enable consumers to disclose their interactions with others. One
key aspect of this type of disclosure is that it involves information relevant to the self and others.
This type of information may be considered co-owned (Petronio 2002). The “owned” part of the
term co-owned information refers to the psychological proprietorship people feel over their selfrelevant information, and their desire to control whether or not it is disclosed to others (Petronio
2002). Co-owned information can be revealed by any of its co-owners, even if not all of them
would like the information to be disclosed (Petronio 2002).
We limited our investigation to information co-owners in the form of P2P transaction
partners. In a P2P transaction, there is a person who initiates a transaction and a partner with
whom they transact. In the present research, we use the term initiator in reference to the person
who chooses a private or public mode of transacting, and the term partner in reference to the
person with whom the initiator is transacting. Transaction-related information is connected to
both initiators and their partners; in other words, the information is co-owned by both.
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How consumers handle co-owned information could be understood as a reflection of
social mindfulness. Social mindfulness involves being thoughtful toward others and making
decisions that are considerate of their needs (Van Lange and Van Doesum 2015). It is tested in
contexts that require making choices that either maximize or reduce others’ options (Van Lange
and Van Doesum 2015). For example, when presented with three green apples and one red, the
socially mindful choice is to take a green apple, as doing so affords the next person the ability to
choose between green and red (Van Lange and Van Doesum 2015).
We suggest that privacy and disclosure also can be understood through a lens of
preserving versus reducing others’ choices. When consumers choose to transact privately, the
transaction information is visible only to initiators and their partners. Partners then have a
choice: they could either continue keeping the transaction information private (e.g., by not telling
anyone it occurred) or they could disclose it to others. When initiators choose to transact
publicly, the transaction information becomes shared with others, and the partner loses the
choice between keeping the information private and making it public2.
In sum, the choice to transact privately represents the socially mindful choice, as it
affords partners a choice between privacy and disclosure. In Venmo, it requires overriding the
default privacy setting, public, thereby suggesting that initiators are actively choosing privacy
over disclosure. We posited that the choosing private transactions would have informational
value to partners, who would recognize private payment as a type of behavior that demonstrates
sensitivity toward others, and attribute the behavior to the presence of communion.
Communion versus agency

2

Consumers are able to change privacy settings of a payment after it is sent (Venmo n.d. b). Yet, the act of
transmitting payment publicly would create a record on the public feed which others could see, and once others are
aware of the transaction, their awareness cannot be reversed (Sharot and Sunstein 2020)).
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Communion and agency are considered fundamental and competing drivers of human
behavior (Bakan 1966). Communion is associated with considering the self in relation to others
(Rucker, Galinsky, and Magee 2018). People displaying strong communal motives tend to show
heightened social focus and concern for others (Frimer et al. 2011; Schwartz 2012). When a
person acts in service of communion, others may use that behavior as a cue to make trait
inferences (Cislak and Wojciszke 2008). Importantly, the perception of traits is strengthened
when the person making the judgment is affected by the action at hand (Cislak and Wojciszke
2006). That is, in the context of a transaction, the initiator’s choice to transact privately or
publicly influences their partner’s privacy. As a result, partners may be especially likely to
perceive the decision to transact privately or publicly as a reflection of the initiator’s traits.
Given that transacting privately (vs. publicly) might be considered a reflection of
communal motives, and that behaviors reflecting communal motives inform inferences of
communal traits, we hypothesized that:

H1: Choosing to transact privately (vs. publicly) drives inferences of stronger communal
traits.

Cooperation
Consumers depend on others to cooperate in myriad settings, including at home, at work,
and in the marketplace (Corfman and Lehmann 1987; Ladley, Wilkinson, and Young 2015;
Schurr and Ozanne 1985). In its most basic form, cooperation is defined as one individual
incurring a cost to benefit another (Rand and Nowak 2013; Stevens, Cushman, and Hauser
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2005). It implies that an individual agrees with the other’s ends, and understands how their own
behavior can influence the achievement of them (Milgram 1965).
Cooperation involves people working together toward one common goal (Mead 2002). It
may take place within interdependent or dependent contexts (Hake and Vukelich 1972). In
interdependent contexts, individuals’ outcomes depend on both their own and their partners’
responses (Hake and Vukelich 1972). In dependent contexts, individuals’ outcomes are mostly
based on someone else’s response (Hake and Vukelich 1972 p. 336). In highly interdependent
contexts, outcomes for the dyad are maximized when all participants choose to cooperate (Van
Lange 1999). Yet defecting, rather than cooperating, can maximize outcomes for individuals
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Thus, before deciding whether to cooperate, individuals try to
estimate whether other participants also will cooperate (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). If
individuals have interacted previously with other participants, they may use information from
past interactions to inform their estimates (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981 p. 1392).
In the present research, we considered scenarios in which two people who participated in
a financial transaction (i.e., initiators and their partners) had a subsequent opportunity to
cooperate. We expected that partners would try to estimate initiators’ propensity to cooperate,
taking into account initiators’ choice of a private or public transaction mode. We suspected that
partners would make inferences about initiators’ likelihood to cooperate based on whether they
transacted privately or publicly, since both cooperating and transacting involve making an
individual decision that affects joint outcomes. As the choice to transact privately represents a
more considerate behavior, partners might expect private initiators to continue to be considerate
of others’ outcomes. For that reason, partners might more strongly expect cooperation from
initiators who choose to transact privately.
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H2: Choosing to transact privately (vs. publicly) drives stronger expectations of
cooperative behavior.

Partners expect this behavioral consistency because they infer private initiators to possess
stronger communal traits. Traits refer to stable dispositions (Epstein 1979) and may be inferred
on the basis of behavior (Jones and Davis 1965) to address the question of why the behavior
occurred (Kelley 1973). In other words, people attribute actions to dispositions. Dispositions are
thought to reflect how a person is inclined to behave in a variety of situations (Jones and Davis
1965 p. 223). People intuit that others’ actions will be consistent (Bem and Allen 1974) and use
trait inferences to predict others’ future behavior (Snyder and Ickes 1985). For example, people
may use trait inferences to estimate whether others will help them or not (Brambilla et al. 2011).
We posited that partners would more strongly expect private initiators to demonstrate subsequent
considerate behavior in the form of cooperation, because they infer private initiators to possess
stronger communal traits, or a dispositional tendency toward behaving considerately toward
others.

H3: Inferences of relatively stronger communal traits mediate stronger expectations of
cooperative behaviors from private (vs. public) initiators.

After estimating others’ cooperation propensity, people then make their own decisions on
whether or not to cooperate (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). These decisions may be influenced by
their impressions of others’ traits (De Bruin and Van Lange 1999) and their expectations of
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reciprocal behavior (Declerck, Boone, and Emonds 2013; Batson 1991). For example, when
people infer others will help, they tend to act in kind (Levine et al. 2018; Rand and Nowak
2013). We posited that partners themselves would be more likely to cooperate with private (vs.
public) initiators, because they infer private initiators to have more considerate dispositions, and
expect private initiators to be more likely to cooperate:

H4a: Choosing to transact privately (vs. publicly) enhances the likelihood that partners
will cooperate.

H4b: Inferences of private (vs. public) initiators’ stronger communal traits mediate
partners’ higher likelihood of cooperating.

H4c: Stronger expectations of cooperative behaviors from private (vs. public) initiators
mediate partners’ higher likelihood of cooperating.

Signaling
Finally, we considered that consumers might use their choices about whether to use
private or public modes of transacting in order to communicate information about the self. In
general, people use behaviors strategically to convey a favorable image to others (Baumeister
1982). Conveying a favorable image can produce positive impressions, which may help with the
achievement of goals (Leary and Kowalski 1990; Schlenker and Leary 1982).
Given that people use expressions of social mindfulness both to form inferences about
others and to signal information about the self (Van Doesum, Van Lange, and Van Lange 2013),
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we expected consumers would use private payments both to form impressions of others, and to
communicate positive information about the self. Specifically, consumers would expect others to
view private payments favorably, and would choose to transact privately in an effort to convey
their own communal orientation. Consumers might do so because they expect others, upon
inferring their relatively strong communal traits, to be more likely to cooperate with them.
Indeed, emerging research suggests that people sometimes use their consumption choices
strategically to encourage cooperation in others (Srna, Barasch, and Small 2020). Thus, we
expected that consumers would use the choice to transact privately or publicly strategically in an
effort to convey their communal traits to others.

H5: The choice to transact privately (vs. publicly) can be used to signal one’s own
communal traits.

Disclosure decisions in the context of financial transactions

We operationalized our constructs in the context of financial transactions (specifically,
P2P payments). This context is relevant because consumers transact with one another frequently;
for example, Venmo users average five transactions per month (Curry 2022). Yet money is often
considered a taboo subject (Goldberg and Lewis 2000; Krueger 1991), or one that is prohibited
as a topic of conversation by custom (Walter 1991). That is, while it is acceptable and
commonplace to discuss companies’ financial performance, people avoid discussing personal
finances (Sun and Slepian 2020). A potential explanation is that people may fear being judged by
others on the basis of their wealth (O’Neil 1993). Consumers also may wish to avoid disclosing
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how they are using money. For example, consumers often wish to conceal purchases related to
alcohol, tobacco, and cosmetics to avoid social consequences (e.g., ridicule; receiving unsought
opinions) (Goodwin 1992). Even seemingly virtuous spending decisions, such as the choice to
purchase an ethical product, are sometimes judged negatively by others (Olson et al. 2016).
Thus, given the potential for information related to money to affect interpersonal judgments, we
expected it to be a context in which social mindfulness matters, since people may prefer having
the option to keep matters of personal finances private (e.g., Goldberg and Lewis 2000;
Garbinsky et al. 2020).
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Overview of Studies

Eight studies tested the established hypotheses in the context of P2P payment platforms.
Study 1 was exploratory; study 6c was an observational quasi-field study; the other six studies
were lab experiments. Studies 2, 3, 4, 6a and 6b were preregistered on AsPredicted.org. Figure 1
provides an overview of the studies and their findings.
Study 1 showed that choosing to transact privately increases partners’ cooperative
intentions (H4a). It does so because partners view private initiators more favorably than public
ones. To probe the nature of these more favorable impressions, study 2 tested if transacting
privately drives inferences of possessing positive, communal traits, or if transacting publicly
drives inferences of possessing negative traits associated with malintent. Results demonstrated
that partners infer private initiators to possess relatively stronger communal traits (H1), which in
turn enhances cooperative intentions (H4b). It did not provide evidence that transacting publicly
drives inferences of other, unfavorable traits. Study 3 examined the effect of transacting privately
(vs. publicly) on cooperation within the context of an ultimatum game. It did so by examining
consumers’ metaperceptions (i.e., how they expect others to perceive them). Results showed that
after sending payments privately (vs. publicly), consumers predict that partners will infer them to
possess stronger communal traits (H5), and, in turn, will view their ultimatum offers as relatively
fair (H3). As a result, private initiators are more confident that partners will cooperate by
accepting their ultimatum game offer (H4c).
In the next studies, we measured cooperative behavior using an ultimatum game (study 4)
and prisoner’s dilemma game (study 5). Because the dependent measures involved making
choices, using these games allowed us to measure behavior. It is important to measure behaviors,
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as they are not always consistent with people’s self-reports (Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder
2007). Study 4 showed that partners are more likely to accept ultimatum game offers from
private initiators (H4a) because they expect greater cooperation in the form of relatively fair
offers (H4c). Study 5 operationalized cooperation through a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, again
showing that partners expect private initiators to behave more cooperatively (H2); as a result,
partners themselves become more likely to cooperate (H4c).
Studies 6a-c examined whether the decision to transact privately versus publicly could be
used as a signaling behavior. Results showed that consumers are more likely to send a payment
privately when they want to convey communal traits, such as being considerate (H5), whereas the
intention to convey other traits, such as being fun, do not show this effect thereby providing a
test of specificity. This set of studies demonstrated that consumers in the United States (study 6a)
and in Europe (study 6b) use private transactions to signal communal traits, and that they do so
both in lab settings (6a-b) and when sending real Venmo payments (6c).
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Figure 1: Overview of Studies.
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Study 1: Paying for lunch

The purpose of this exploratory study was to provide initial evidence that choosing to
transact privately positively impacts partners’ perceptions of and behavioral intentions toward
initiators. Specifically, we tested whether partners might develop more favorable impressions of
those who transacted privately (vs. publicly). Generally, people develop a positive view toward
those who promote the satisfaction of their own needs (Deutsch 1949). Thus, if people view
choosing privacy over disclosure as an action that is mindful of their own needs and preferences,
they might develop more favorable impressions of private initiators. We also tested whether
choosing to transact privately would increase partners’ cooperative intentions. Finally, we
examined whether the more positive impressions created by choosing private (vs. public) modes
of transacting mediates partners’ stronger cooperative intensions. Since this study was
exploratory, several other features of payments were tested in separate, between-subjects
conditions. Those factors are not reported, as they do not relate to the current investigation.
Method
Sixty-seven student participants (57.8% female, Mage = 22.29, SD = 4.52) recruited
through a subject pool at a large, public college participated in exchange for partial course credit.
Participants read a description of the P2P payment platform Venmo, which explained what
Venmo does and how it can be used. We asked participants if they had ever used Venmo; the
majority (55.2%) reported they had.
Next, participants read a scenario about going to lunch with a classmate whom they did
not know very well. In the scenario, they were asked to imagine that they had paid the entire bill
and that the classmate had reimbursed them for half using Venmo. Participants were randomly
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assigned to either a private or public reimbursement condition, and thus read that the classmate
had sent payment privately or publicly. We displayed images of the ostensible transaction, which
featured either a padlock in the private condition or an icon of a globe in the public condition.
We measured favorability to understand whether participants viewed the classmate
positively or negatively (Schnittka, Sattler, and Farsky 2013) using three items, “Given this
Venmo transaction, what impression do you have of your classmate?” (positive: 1 = Very
negative; 5 = Very positive; favorable: 1 = Very unfavorable; 5 = Very favorable; and good: 1 =
Very bad; 5 = Very good) (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). Participants also indicated
how likely they are to pay for their classmate again (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 = Extremely
likely). In this context, paying for a classmate again implies lending the classmate money on the
premise that they will pay it back. Thus, lending money represents incurring a (temporary) cost
in order to benefit another, which is consistent with the definition of cooperation (Rand and
Nowak 2013; Stevens et al. 2005). Finally, participants provided their cubicle number and the
time at which their session began, and continued to another, separate study in which
demographic information was collected.
Results
First, we tested whether consumers would have a more positive impression of private
initiators. All three favorability items loaded on a single factor and were averaged to form a
single composite measure (α = .97). Participants had a more favorable impression of private (vs.
public) initiators (Mprivate = 4.42, SD = .77 vs. Mpublic = 3.63, SD = 1.13; F(1, 65) = 11.35, p =
.001, ηp2 = .15).
Then, we tested willingness to pay again as a function of whether their classmate had
been said to send a payment to them privately or publicly. Results showed that participants were
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more likely to pay for private initiators again (Mprivate = 6.21, SD = 1.19 vs. Mpublic = 4.82, SD =
1.82; F(1, 65) = 13.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .17). This finding provided preliminary evidence that
consumers are more likely to cooperate with partners who choose to transact privately versus
publicly (H4a).
Last, we tested whether enhanced perceptions of favorability mediated the positive effect
of transacting privately versus publicly on cooperation willingness. Results confirmed the
mediational role of favorability (indirect effect = .93, 95% CI [.40, 1.49] using 10,000
bootstrapped samples, PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes 2017)).
Discussion
Study 1 revealed that private initiators are viewed more favorably than public ones. It
also provided initial evidence that choosing private (vs. public) payment increases partners’
cooperative intentions. This effect is mediated by more favorable impressions of private
initiators. We acknowledge that favorability is a general construct that captures only the valence
of impressions (Nasukawa and Yi 2003). Hence the next study probed the nature of these
positive impressions by measuring specific perceptions of initiators’ traits.
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Study 2: Mediation through communal traits

This preregistered study had several objectives. One, we aimed to provide initial evidence
that the decision to transact privately versus publicly informs inferences of initiators’ communal
traits. Two, we sought to replicate the main effect of transacting privately versus publicly on
cooperative intentions, this time by asking participants’ how likely they would be to endorse or
recommend the initiator, and how likely they would be to pay for them again. Both endorsing
initiators and paying for them again represent small costs to the self that would benefit the
initiator, which is consistent with the definition of cooperation (Rand and Nowak 2013). Three,
we sought to test whether inferences of stronger communal traits mediate the effect of
transacting privately on stronger cooperative intentions. Four, we sought to investigate an
alternative explanation: that transacting publicly suggests the presence of malintent toward
others, thus informing inferences of stronger negative traits (not merely weaker communal
traits). To investigate this possibility, we included measures of socially aversive traits,
specifically narcissism, self-centeredness, insecurity, and vanity (DeWall et al. 2011; Jones and
Paulhus 2014). We also measured perceptions of materialism, which is a combination of nongenerosity, envy, and possessiveness (Belk 1985), and neuroticism, which is a predisposition to
experiencing negative affect, especially in response to stress (Barlow et al. 2014; McCrae 1990).
Method
We collected 157 responses. Following our preregistration
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2us4w9), we removed 32 participants who failed two or
more of the three attention check questions. Two people did not finish the survey. This left a
usable sample of 123 participants (56.0% male, Mage = 36.22, SD = 10.35). According to
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G*Power analyses (Faul et al. 2007), a sample of at least 80 participants would be able to detect
relatively large effect sizes consistent with what we found in study 1 (fs > .37), with 80% power
(α = .05). In this and all subsequent studies, we aimed to recruit a minimum of 80 participants.
Participants were randomly assigned either to the private or public payment condition.
All read a scenario similar to the one used in study 1, in which they imagined that they went to
lunch with a new friend, paid the entire bill, and then received a payment from their friend for
half of the bill. Depending on the condition to which they were assigned, participants read that
the payment had been sent privately or publicly. They also were shown a corresponding image of
the payment. In the private condition, the image of the payment contained a padlock (see figure
2). In the public condition, the image of the payment contained a world symbol (see figure 3).

Figure 2: Image of the private payment (study 2)

Figure 3: Image of the public payment (study 2)
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Participants answered two questions indicating their cooperative intentions: “Based on
this scenario, how likely are you to pay for your friend again?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 =
Extremely likely) and “Based on this scenario, how likely would you be to endorse (or
recommend) your friend to others?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 = Extremely likely). Participants
also rated how strongly they agreed that the friend possessed traits associated with communion
(i.e., sincere, considerate, conscientious, generous, agreeable, and trustworthy) and various
negative traits (i.e., self-centered, vain, materialistic, narcissistic, insecure, and neurotic) (1 =
Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). As a manipulation check, we asked participants, “In the
scenario you read, how did you friend send the payment?” and participants selected either
privately or publicly.
Manipulation check
The manipulation check indicated that participants understood how the payment was sent.
That is, 83.9% of participants in the private condition selected “Private,” and in the public
condition, 13.1% of participants selected “Private;” 2 = 61.61; p < .001, Cramer’s V = .71).
Results
We conducted two preregistered analyses to test if private payment enhanced cooperative
intentions. As predicted, and replicating results from study 1, participants were more likely to
pay again for a private initiator (Mprivate = 6.27, SD = 1.04 vs. Mpublic = 5.79, SD = 1.39; F(1, 121)
= 4.84, p = .03, ηp2 = .04). Participants also were more likely to endorse private initiators (Mprivate
= 6.19, SD = 1.23 vs. Mpublic = 5.44, SD = 1.40; F(1, 121) = 10.05, p < .01, ηp2 = .08).
Because both of these items reflected partners’ cooperative intentions, we created an
index by averaging them (α = .71). Results showed that on average, people express stronger
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cooperative intentions toward private versus public initiators (Mprivate = 6.23, SD = 1.06 vs.
Mpublic = 5.62; SD = 1.16, F(1, 121) = 9.54, p < .01, ηp2 = .07).
The six traits associated with communion (sincere, considerate, conscientious, generous,
agreeable, and trustworthy) were averaged to form an overall index (α = .87). Consistent with
our theorizing, private initiators were inferred to possess stronger communal traits (Mprivate =
5.88, SD = .86 vs. Mpublic = 5.32, SD = 1.07; F(1, 121) = 10.47, p < .01, ηp2 = .08).
Next, we tested whether the perception of communal traits played a mediational role in
the relationship between transaction privacy and cooperative intentions. We found that the
perception of stronger communal traits mediated the relationship between private payment and
enhanced willingness to pay for the person again (indirect effect = .35, 95% CI [.14, .61]),
enhanced willingness to endorse or recommend (indirect effect = .43, 95% CI [.15, .78]), and the
relatively stronger composite measure of cooperative intentions, (indirect effect = .39, 95% CI
[.15, .67]), all using 10,000 bootstrapped samples, PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes 2017).
We then tested the alternative possibility that choosing to transact publicly (vs. privately)
strengthens perceptions of negative intent, thus informing perceptions of unfavorable traits. The
six negative traits (narcissistic, insecure, vain, materialistic, self-centered, and neurotic) had
strong reliability (α = .94) and were averaged to form a composite measure. For this, we found
no difference between private and public initiators (Mprivate = 2.39, SD = 1.52 vs. Mpublic = 2.75,
SD = 1.56; F(1, 121) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp2 = .01).
Discussion
This preregistered study provided support for H4a, showing that the choice to pay
privately increases partners’ intentions to cooperate with the initiator by endorsing them to others
or covering their expenses at a future time. It also provided initial support for the hypotheses that
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partners infer private initiators to have stronger communal traits (H1), and that the perception of
stronger communal traits mediates the relationship between transacting privately (vs. publicly)
and stronger intentions to cooperate (H4b). We investigated the alternative possibility that the
decision to pay publicly might suggest nefarious or negative intent, as indicated by perceptions
of negative traits. The results did not support that alternative hypothesis.
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Study 3: Private Payment Encourages Others to Cooperate

In this preregistered study, we sought to replicate the effect of choosing to transact
privately on perceptions of communal traits. This time, participants imagined that they had sent
payment either privately or publicly. Then they provided metaperceptions, meaning their
perceptions of how their partners would view their traits and behaviors, based on having sent a
transaction either privately or publicly. We also investigated participants’ perceptions of how
cooperatively their partners would respond in an interdependent cooperative context. To create
such a context, we used an ultimatum game, which is an economic game commonly used to test
cooperative behaviors (Kahneman et al. 1986; Larrick and Blount 1997; Straub and Mirninghan
1995; Wallace et al. 2007).
In an ultimatum game, there are two players: a proposer and a responder. The proposer
has a sum of money to divide (the total sum of which the responder is unaware), and makes an
offer of money to the responder. In this study, we specified that the proposer had between $1.00
and $4.00 to divide, and made an offer of $0.75. We chose this offer amount because it was
ambiguous, and could represent a generous offer (if the proposer had less than $1.50 to divide), a
fair offer (if the proposer had exactly $1.50 to divide) or an unfair offer (if the proposer had more
than $1.50 to divide). The responder could either accept or reject the offer, and the key is that
both parties’ outcomes are determined by this choice. If the responder accepts the offer, they
receive the amount of money offered and the proposer keeps the balance. If they reject the offer,
neither party receives any money.
In the study, participants read a scenario in which they imagined that they would be
playing an ultimatum game with a new friend. Prior to playing the game, they imagined sending
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either a private or public payment to this new friend. We expected that participants who
imagined sending a payment privately (vs. publicly) would expect their new friend to infer that
they had stronger communal traits, and to infer that their ultimatum game offer was relatively
fair. Making a fair offer represents cooperative behavior, as it reflects incurring a cost (in the
form of keeping less money) in order to encourage offer acceptance, which benefits the dyad.
Expecting that their offers would be seen as relatively fair, private initiators might then be more
confident that partners would accept the offer. Accepting the offer also is a cooperative behavior,
as it represents acting toward a common goal that maximizes outcomes for the dyad.
Method
The design and analyses for this study are preregistered at
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=7FF_9F9. We recruited 222 workers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (60.4% male, Mage = 37.74, SD = 9.22) to participate in exchange for monetary
compensation.
Participants read a description of the ultimatum game, which was presented as “The
Proposer-Responder Game.” The conditions of the game were outlined and it was stated that
negotiating was not allowed. Participants learned that they would be playing the role of proposer.
A new friend of theirs would play the role of responder.
Next, they imagined that as they were getting ready to play the game, they remembered
that they owed their friend – the same one with whom they would be playing the ultimatum
game – a bit of money. Specifically, they owed the friend $3.00 because the friend recently had
paid for their coffee. Participants read, “You decide to send a Venmo payment of $3.00 now,
before you play the proposer-responder game.” As a manipulation of transaction privacy,
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participants read that they had sent the payment either privately or publicly and were shown an
image of the payment. The image showed either a private transaction or a public one.
Then participants read that they would now play the game, and that they, as the proposer,
would offer their friend $0.75. As a measure of expected cooperation, we asked, “How likely is
your friend to accept your offer?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 = Extremely likely). To measure
offer fairness, we asked, “What does your friend think of your offer?” (1 = Extremely unfair; 9 =
Extremely fair).
To measure perceptions of their communal traits, we asked, “Given that you sent the
payment in private [public] mode, to what extent would your friend agree that you are: sincere,
considerate, conscientious, agreeable, generous, and trustworthy (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 =
Strongly agree). As in study 2, these items were averaged and reported as an index (α = .920).
Participants then answered the manipulation check question, “Did you send the payment to your
friend publicly or privately?” (response options: publicly vs. privately), and provided
demographic information.
Manipulation check
The manipulation check indicated that participants understood they had paid their friend
either privately or publicly. In the private condition, 85.0% of participants chose “Privately.” In
the public condition, 5.5% chose “Privately” (2 = 141.02; p < .001, Cramer’s V = .80).
Results
As predicted, participants in the private (vs. public) condition thought their friend would
agree more strongly that they possessed communal traits (Mprivate = 5.39, SD = 1.13 vs. Mpublic =
4.82, SD = 1.26; F(1, 219) = 12.429, p < .001, ηp2 = .05). They also thought their friend would
perceive their offer as being fairer (Mprivate = 6.16, SD = 2.12 vs. Mpublic = 5.46, SD = 2.24; F(1,
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220) = 5.74, p = .02, ηp2 = .03). Private initiators did not think the friend would be more likely to
accept their ultimatum game offer (Mprivate = 5.27, SD = 1.48 vs. Mpublic = 4.95, SD = 1.60; F(1,
220) = 2.55, p = .11, ηp2 = .01).
A mediation analysis showed that metaperceptions of stronger communal traits mediated
the relationship between transacting privately and stronger metaperceptions of offer fairness
(indirect effect = .52, 95% CI [.22, .87]). A second mediation analysis showed that stronger
metaperceptions of communal traits mediated the relationship between transacting privately and
stronger expectations that the friend would accept the ultimatum game offer (indirect effect =
.34, 95% CI [.15, .56]). To test our full theoretical model, we conducted a mediation analysis
with private versus public payment as the independent variable (Private = 1; Public = 0), the
metaperceptions of communal traits as the first mediator, offer fairness as the second mediator,
and expectations that the friend would accept the ultimatum game offer as the dependent
variable. The analysis revealed a significant, positive indirect effect, with a 95% confidence
interval that excluded zero (indirect effect = .16, 95% CI [.06, .30], with 10,000 bootstrapped
samples, PROCESS Model 6; Hayes 2017).
Discussion
Study 3 demonstrated that when consumers transact privately (vs. publicly) they expect
others to view their own traits and behaviors more favorably. In particular, they intuit that
choosing to transact privately strengthens partners’ perceptions of their communal traits (H1). In
turn, they think partners will expect them to behave cooperatively, in this case by extending a
fair offer (H3). As a result, private initiators expect that partners will be more likely to cooperate
by accepting their ultimatum game offer (H4c).
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One limitation of this study is that it measured participants’ expectations of others’
behavior rather than measuring actual behavior. To address this, our next studies operationalized
cooperation through an ultimatum game (study 4) and a prisoner’s dilemma (study 5). These
economic games provided cooperative contexts with a high degree of interdependence, and an
opportunity to measure participants’ actual cooperative behaviors, which were expressed as
choices within the games.
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Study 4: Willingness to Cooperate in an Ultimatum Game

This preregistered experiment sought to provide evidence that partners more strongly
expect private initiators to behave cooperatively, and that in turn, partners themselves become
more likely to cooperate. We used a between-subjects design in which participants imagined
receiving either a private or public payment from an initiator. Then, participants imagined
playing an ultimatum game with this same person. In the game, participants played the role of
responder and the initiator played the role of proposer. As responders, participants evaluated the
fairness of the offer and made choices about whether to cooperate by accepting it.
Method
We preregistered this study (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=5mt5ka) and recruited
200 participants on Prolific (57.1% male; Mage = 32.36; SD = 9.59). While all 200 participants
answered the first question (“How familiar are you with Venmo?” (1 = Not at all familiar; 7 =
Extremely familiar)), two did not finish the study, leaving a usable sample of 198.
Participants read the scenario that was used in study 2, in which they learned that a new
friend sent a Venmo payment for half of their lunch bill either privately or publicly. Then
participants answered the cooperative intentions questions from study 2: “Based on this scenario,
how likely are you to pay for your friend again in the future?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 =
Extremely likely); and “Based on this scenario, how likely would you be to endorse (or
recommend) your friend to others?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 = Extremely likely).
Next participants read that they would be playing an ultimatum game with this same
friend who had paid them. The game was presented as “The Proposer-Responder Game.” The
conditions of the game were outlined and it was stated that negotiating was not allowed.
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Then, all participants read that they had been assigned to the role of responder and their
friend had been assigned to the role of proposer, receiving between $1.00 and $4.00 to split
between the two of them. Participants rated how fair they expected the offer to be (1=Extremely
unfair; 7=Extremely fair).
Next, participants read that their friend had offered them $0.75. At this point, participants
rated their likelihood of accepting the offer (1=Extremely unlikely; 7=Extremely likely), and
chose one of two options: accept or reject the offer. Finally, participants answered a
manipulation check question and demographic questions.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check confirmed that participants understood and remembered whether
their friend had transmitted the reimbursement for lunch privately or publicly. In the private
condition, 96.0% of participants selected “Privately.” In the public condition, 4.3% of
participants selected “Privately” (2 = 146.46; p < .001, Cramer’s V = .86).
Results
We tested whether sending payment privately increases partners’ expectations that the
initiator would behave cooperatively, and in turn enhances partners’ cooperation willingness in
the form of offer acceptance. As predicted, participants in the private condition expected
initiators’ offers to be fairer (Mprivate = 5.94, SD = 1.25 vs. Mpublic = 5.58, SD = 1.24; F(1, 196) =
4.11, p = .04, ηp2 = .02), and indicated that they would be more likely to accept the offer (Mprivate
= 4.63, SD = 2.23 vs. Mpublic = 4.02, SD = 2.11; F(1, 196) = 3.91, p = .05, ηp2 = .02). In terms of
the decision to accept or reject the offer, 68.0% of participants in the private condition chose to
accept, versus 60.2% in the public condition (2 = 1.31; p = .25, Cramer’s V = .08).
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A mediation analysis provided support for the hypothesis that stronger perceptions of
cooperative behavior in the form of offer fairness mediate the relationship between paying
privately and partners’ greater reported likelihood of accepting the offer. The 10,000 bootstrap,
95% confidence interval excluded zero (indirect effect = .11, 95% CI [.0003, .30], PROCESS
Model 4, Hayes 2017).
Finally, consistent with study 2, results showed that participants were more likely to pay
for a private initiator again (Mprivate = 6.50, SD = .84 vs. Mpublic = 5.37, SD = 1.69; F(1, 196) =
35.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .16). They also were more likely to endorse or recommend a private
initiator (Mprivate = 6.15, SD = .99 vs. Mpublic = 5.40, SD = 1.41; F(1, 196) = 18.90, p < .001, ηp2 =
.09).
Discussion
This preregistered study demonstrated that the choice to transact privately versus publicly
influences cooperation even in a subsequent, unrelated context: that of an ultimatum game. More
specifically, this study provided support for the hypothesis that partners are more likely to
cooperate with private (vs. public) initiators (H4a). This is because partners expect private
initiators to behave more cooperatively (i.e., by extending a fair offer; H2), which in turn induces
them to cooperate (H4c). We acknowledge that on the actual choice to accept or reject the
ultimatum game offer, private initiators were not significantly more likely to accept. Yet when
asked how likely they would be to accept an ultimatum game offer from a new friend who had
just paid them, results showed that those who received a private payment reported being more
likely to accept, a finding consistent with our preregistered hypothesis.
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Study 5: Willingness to Cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

In this study, we sought to replicate the effects found in study 4 in a different context:
that of a prisoner’s dilemma game. The prisoner’s dilemma game features an incentivecompatible design and is well established as a measure of cooperative behavior (Axelrod 1980;
Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and Sigmund 1993). In the game, participants read a
scenario and choose to cooperate or defect. Choosing to defect can produce the greatest possible
gains for the self, but mutual cooperation produces the best outcome for the dyad (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981). Thus, the game tests if participants are willing to incur a cost to the self (in
terms of foregoing the highest possible individual gain) in order to benefit the dyad, which is
consistent with the definition of cooperation (Rand and Nowak 2013). We used a version of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game that involved completing a tedious task (Srna et al. 2020).
Method
We collected 192 responses from undergraduate students and eliminated those who failed
a comprehension check question, leaving a usable sample of 150 participants (60.0% female;
Mage = 20.91, SD = 3.27). They received partial course credit in exchange for participation.
Participants first read a brief description of Venmo, which stated that one part of the
study would involve a scenario related to Venmo. They answered the question, “How familiar
are you with Venmo?” (1 = Not at all familiar; 7 = Extremely familiar).
Next, participants were asked to imagine that they went to class one day and learned they
would be working on a CAPTCHA task with a classmate. Participants viewed an example
CAPTCHA, which was a seven-letter word that was visually obscured (see figure 4, adapted
from Allen (2013)). They were asked to type in the letters. On the next screen, participants read
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that the classmate with whom they would play was sitting in a separate room. They also read that
the number of CAPTCHAs they would solve would be based on how many CAPTCHAs they
were willing to solve and how many CAPTCHAs their classmate was willing to solve.
According to the scenario, there were several possible outcomes: if both people chose to
complete 30 CAPTCHAs, then both would complete 30; if both people chose to complete zero
CAPTCHAs, then both would complete 60; or, if one person chose to complete 30 CAPTCHAs
and the other person chose to complete zero CAPTCHAs, the person who volunteered to
complete 30 CAPTCHAs would complete 90, and the other person would complete zero.

Figure 4: Image of a CAPTCHA (Allen 2013)

After reading these instructions, participants completed a comprehension check question
that began, “Therefore, the number of CAPTCHAs you complete is based on...” The possible
responses were, “The number of CAPTCHAs you decide to complete,” “The number of
CAPTCHAs your classmate decides to complete,” or “The number of CAPTCHAs both you and
your classmate decide to complete.” The correct answer was “The number of CAPTCHAs both
you and your classmate decide to complete.” If any participant answered incorrectly, their
responses to all survey questions were removed from the dataset.
After this comprehension check question, participants learned that the classmate with
whom they were paired was an acquaintance with whom they got coffees last week. They
imagined that they had paid for both coffees and the classmate had reimbursed them using
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Venmo. Upon reaching this question, participants were randomly assigned to either the private or
public payment condition. In regard to the classmate’s payment, participants in the private
condition read, “They sent the payment privately, which means it was visible to only you and
your classmate,” and an image of a payment with a lock symbol was displayed on the screen.
Participants in the public payment condition read, “They sent the payment publicly, which means
it was visible to anyone on Venmo,” and an image of a payment with a world symbol was
displayed on the screen. To encourage participants to read the information carefully, we asked an
open-ended question, “How did your classmate pay you back?”
Then, participants read, “It’s time to make a choice. How many CAPTCHAs are you
willing to complete?” (response options: “0 CAPTCHAs” or “30 CAPTCHAs”). Next,
participants evaluated how they expected the classmate to respond by answering the question, “If
you had to guess, how many CAPTCHAs will your classmate decide to complete?” (response
options: “0 CAPTCHAs” or “30 CAPTCHAs”). Participants also answered a manipulation check
and several demographic questions.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check verified that participants understood and recalled that their
classmate had reimbursed them either privately or publicly. In the private condition, 100.0% of
participants selected “Privately.” In the public condition, 8.3% of participants selected
“Privately” (2 = 56.00; p < .001, Cramer’s V = .91).
Results
We tested whether transacting privately induced cooperation in the form of choosing to
complete 30 CAPTCHAs. A chi-square test showed that in the private condition 71.4% of
participants chose to complete 30 CAPTCHAs, compared to 57.5% in the public condition (χ2 =
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3.17; p = .08, Cramer’s V = .15). While this result was not significant, it was directionally
aligned with our hypothesis.
Then we tested whether transacting privately increased expectations that the classmate
would behave cooperatively. As predicted, a greater proportion of participants in the private
condition (72.7%) than in the public condition (54.8%) expected their partners would complete
30 CAPTCHAs (χ2 = 5.23; p = .02, Cramer’s V = .19).
To test whether stronger expectations of cooperative behavior among private initiators
mediates the relationship between initiators’ choice of private (vs. public) payment and partners’
greater cooperation willingness, we conducted a mediation analysis using the lavaan package in
R (Rosseel 2012). In support of H4c, results showed a significant, positive indirect effect, with a
confidence interval excluding zero (indirect effect = .35, 95% CI [.06, .63]).
Discussion
This study provided evidence that partners are more confident that private (vs. public)
initiators will behave cooperatively in a cooperative context (H2). In turn, partners are more
likely to cooperate themselves (H4c), in this case by agreeing to solve 30 CAPTCHAs.
Together, 2-5 provided evidence that choosing a private mode of payment suggests
possessing stronger communal traits and being more likely to cooperate. This, in turn, makes
partners more willing to cooperate themselves. Given that communal traits can encourage
cooperation in others, we next turned to the question of whether people might use private versus
public transactions strategically, to communicate their communal traits to others.
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Study 6a: Paying to Communicate Personality Traits in the United States

The goal of study 6a was to examine whether consumers might use the choice to transact
privately versus publicly to enhance others’ perceptions of their communal traits. We challenged
people to signal either a communal trait (i.e., that of being considerate) or another trait (i.e., that
of being fun) through their transactions in a simulated P2P payment interface.
Method
We pre-registered this study (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=91V_15M) and
recruited 194 undergraduate students (57.7% female; Mage = 21.39; SD = 3.953). They received
partial course credit in exchange for participation.
Participants first read a brief description of Venmo and answered the question, “How
familiar are you with Venmo?” (1 = Not at all familiar; 7 = Extremely familiar). Then they read
that in the next part of the study they would simulate sending a $0.25 Venmo payment to a
fellow participant. An image of the payment interface was displayed, showing the fields they
would fill out. The fields were: “Amount of payment” (open-ended), “Memo” (open-ended),
“Select a privacy setting” (response options: “Public (visible to anyone on Venmo)” or “Private
(visible only to you and the recipient)”), and “Is this a payment, or a request for payment?”
(response options: “Payment” or “Request for payment”).
Then participants were randomly assigned to an objective: either to convey that they were
considerate or to convey that they were fun. Participants read, “Imagine that the participant who
receives your payment will rate you based on how considerate [fun] you seem. It is very
important to use your payment to show them that you are considerate [fun].” Participants also
read,
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“To communicate how considerate [fun] you are, we strongly recommend that you use some
of the features offered by Venmo:
•

Choose a public or private payment setting

•

Leave a note

•

Use an emoji

•

Or do anything else that shows you are considerate [fun].”
On the next screen, participants simulated sending the payment by completing the four

fields (amount; memo; private or public; payment or request for payment). The key dependent
measure was the selection of a privacy setting (private or public). They also answered the
question, “How likely are you to send this payment privately, so that it is only visible to you and
the recipient?” (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 = Extremely likely).
Last, participants answered the manipulation check question, “When you sent the
payment, what kind of impression were you trying to make?” (response options: considerate vs.
fun). Then they continued to another, separate study in which demographic information was
collected.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check confirmed that participants understood which trait they were trying
to convey. In response to the question, “When you sent the payment, what kind of impression
were you trying to make?”, 76.3% of those in the considerate condition selected “Considerate.”
In the fun condition, 28.9% selected “Considerate” (χ2 = 43.75; p < .001, Cramer’s V = .48).
Results
As predicted, a chi-square test confirmed that the desire to convey considerateness
induced private payment. Of participants in the considerate condition, 74.2% chose to pay
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privately, versus 54.6% of those in the fun condition (χ2 = 8.12; p < .01, Cramer’s V = .21).
However, participants in the considerate (vs. fun) condition did not report that they would be
more likely to send payment privately (Mconsiderate = 5.81, SD = 1.77 vs. Mfun = 5.33, SD = 2.06;
F(1, 192) = 3.10, p = .08, ηp2 = .02).
Discussion
Study 6a provided evidence that people use their choice to transact either privately or
publicly to signal their own communal traits to others (H5). When consumers are trying to
communicate their own positive communal traits, such as that of being considerate, a greater
portion choose to pay privately, compared when they are trying to communicate a different
positive character trait such as that of being fun. While participants in the considerate (vs. fun)
condition did not report that they would be more likely to send payment privately, a greater
proportion did actually choose to pay privately, a result that supported our hypothesis.
One limitation of this study is that it was conducted within a population that was already
familiar with the Venmo platform. In response to the question, “How familiar are you with
Venmo?” (1 = Not at all familiar; 7 = Extremely familiar), the mean response was well above the
midpoint, at 5.046 (SD = 2.097). This opened the question of whether the effect had emerged due
to specific associations participants had developed while previously using the platform. For
example, if participants associated public payments with friends they considered to be fun, that
might have influenced them to transact publicly when trying to convey that they were fun. To
help rule out this possibility, we next tested whether this effect would replicate within a
population that was less familiar with the Venmo platform.
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Study 6b: Paying to Communicate Personality Traits in Europe

The goal of study 6b was to again test the hypothesis that people choose privacy over
disclosure when they wish to signal their communal traits to partners. We tested the hypothesis
among a population that was relatively less familiar with the Venmo platform, reasoning that if
the effect only emerges due to social norms or associations developed through using the Venmo
platform, then it would be unlikely to emerge in this population. Yet if the effect functions
independently of consumers’ previous experience with the platform – which we posited that it
does – then it would replicate among this population. To test this possibility, we conducted study
6b in Europe.
Method
We pre-registered this study (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=BBD_PG5) and
recruited 190 undergraduate students to participate in exchange for partial course credit. A total
of 188 students (55.1% female; Mage = 20.40; SD = 8.36) completed more than one question.
Participants first read a description of Venmo, which explained the features of the app
and stated that it was similar to Bizum, a payment platform commonly used in some European
countries. Then they answered the question, “How familiar are you with Venmo?” (1 = Not at all
familiar; 7 = Extremely familiar).
From that point, the same procedure was used as in study 6a. Participants read that they
would be sending a simulated payment. They were randomly assigned to convey that they were
either considerate or fun. Participants then simulated sending the payment by completing four
fields (amount; memo; private or public; payment or request for payment). The choice of private
or public payment served as the main dependent measure. As in study 6a, participants also

42

indicated how likely they would be to send payment privately (1 = Extremely unlikely; 7 =
Extremely likely). Finally, participants answered the manipulation check question, “When you
sent the payment, what kind of impression were you trying to make? (response options:
considerate vs. fun), and provided demographic information.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check confirmed that participants understood which trait they were trying
to convey. In response to the question, “When you sent the payment, what kind of impression
were you trying to make?”, 76.8% of those in the considerate condition selected “Considerate.”
In the fun condition, 33.3% selected “Considerate” (χ2 = 35.992, p < .001).
Results
We conducted two preregistered analyses. First, to analyze the binary dependent variable
in which participants chose to send the simulated payment either privately or publicly, we used a
chi-square test. Results confirmed our hypothesis, as 71.6% of participants in the considerate
condition selected the private mode of payment, while 53.8% of participants in the fun condition
selected the private mode of payment (χ2 = 6.38; p = .01, Cramer’s V = .18). Second, we
conducted a one-way analysis of variance to determine whether participants in the considerate
condition (vs. the fun condition) are more likely to send payment privately. Results showed that
participants in the considerate condition reported being more likely to send payment privately
(Mconsiderate = 5.73, SD = 1.68 vs. Mfun = 5.08, SD = 1.98; F(1, 186) = 5.93, p = .02, ηp2 = .03).
These effects emerged even though participants were relatively unfamiliar with Venmo.
Compared with participants in study 6a, participants in study 6b were significantly less familiar
with the platform (Mstudy 6a = 5.05, Mstudy 6b = 2.79; F(1, 380) = 112.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .23).
Discussion
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In this preregistered study, we provided evidence that people intuit the positive
implications of keeping co-owned information private, even when they are using a platform with
which they are not familiar. Consistent with study 6a, this study demonstrated that consumers are
more likely to select a private mode of transacting when wish to convey their own communal
traits versus other positive, non-communal traits (H5). Yet, one limitation of studies 6a and 6b is
that participants transmitted a simulated payment in a lab environment. To augment ecological
validity, we conducted study 6c, which was an observational, quasi-field study in which
participants transmitted actual payments on Venmo.
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Study 6c: Communicating Personality Traits through Real Payments

Study 6c again tested whether consumers are more likely to transmit a real payment
privately when they are trying to convey a communal trait versus another personality trait. In this
observational quasi-field study, participants sent a real monetary payment. Then they reported
which trait they were most trying to convey (i.e., that of being considerate, or that of being fun)
and how they chose to pay (i.e., privately or publicly).
Method
Following the G*Power analyses of the results from study 1, which indicated that 80
participants would be needed to detect even a large effect, we aimed to recruit a minimum of 80
participants. Yet, due to limited participant availability we were only able to recruit 60
undergraduate students (60.0% female; Mage = 22.39; SD = 5.15). Those students participated in
exchange for monetary compensation of $5.00.
The survey was conducted in three parts. In part one, participants provided their Venmo
handle. In part two, participants were sent a $0.25 Venmo payment. To maintain participant
confidentiality, these payments were sent to participants privately, so that each payment was
visible only to the principal investigator and the participant. In the payment’s “What’s it for”
memo line, they received a message saying “Here is $0.25 and part 2 of the Venmo Study. Please
click the link now” (a hyperlink was included).
When participants clicked the link, they were directed to a Qualtrics survey. In it, they
read that they would be sending a Venmo payment of $0.25 to a fellow participant. In the next
screen, participants viewed the Venmo handle of the fellow participant (a confederate), were
instructed to send payment to this person, and confirmed once they had sent the $0.25.
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In part three, participants were sent a Venmo payment of $0.25. This payment
represented a portion of their total compensation and, importantly, enabled us to distribute the
link to the third and final survey. Participants clicked the link within the payment, and began the
survey. In it, we reminded them of the Venmo payment they had sent in part two. We asked,
“When you sent the payment, what kind of impression were you trying to make?” and provided
the response options of considerate versus fun. Then, participants indicated whether they had
sent the payment privately or publicly. Finally, participants answered demographic questions.
Results
A chi-square test showed that participants who wanted to convey considerateness were
more likely to send a private payment. Of the participants who selected “Considerate,” 82.6%
sent payment privately, and of the participants who selected “Fun,” 52.8% sent the payment
privately (χ2 = 5.45; p = .02, Cramer’s V = .30).
Discussion
Study 6c obtained evidence, using real payment behavior, that consumers when wish to
convey their own communal traits, such as that of being considerate, they are more likely to
conduct transactions privately (H5). When they are trying to communicate a different character
trait such as that of being fun, they are less likely to select a private mode of transacting.
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General Discussion and Conclusion

General Discussion
Online platforms present consumers with a novel possibility: that of interacting either
privately or publicly with others. When consumers choose between transacting privately or
publicly, their decision influences partners’ privacy and ability to decide between privacy and
disclosure in the future. We proposed that choosing privacy over disclosure represents a socially
mindful behavior that signals information about the self, informs partners’ inferences of one’s
traits, and influences partners’ willingness to cooperate, even in a subsequent, unrelated context.
This is important knowledge for consumers to have as they face decisions about making their
interactions with others private or public.
We used an ecologically valid testing context, P2P payment platforms, to demonstrate
that there are interpersonal benefits associated with choosing to transact privately. Money, when
it comes to personal finances, is a sensitive topic that consumers avoid discussing (Sun and
Slepian 2020). We have theorized that choosing to keep transactions private reflects
interpersonal sensitivity, which is suggestive of communal motives. As a result, choosing to
transact privately drives inferences of possessing stronger communal traits (studies 2 and 3). It
enhances partners’ cooperative intentions (studies 1 and 2) and actual cooperative behavior in an
ultimatum game (study 4) or prisoner’s dilemma game (study 5). Greater cooperation willingness
is mediated by the perception that private initiators possess relatively stronger communal traits
(studies 2 and 3), and are more likely to act cooperatively by making a fair offer (studies 3 and 4)
or volunteering to complete a tedious task (study 5).
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Choosing to transact privately (vs. publicly) also has signaling capabilities. Studies 6a-c
showed that consumers are more likely to choose privacy over disclosure when they want to
communicate their own communal traits (e.g., considerateness) versus when they want to
communicate other traits (e.g., that of being fun). What is more, consumers may choose privacy
over disclosure strategically, to encourage cooperation in others. Study 3 supported this notion,
demonstrating that consumers who had transacted privately expected greater cooperation in an
ultimatum game from their partners. We found support for these hypotheses in the United States
and Europe, and in adult and student populations alike, suggesting that these effects are
generalizable. The effects emerge within existing relationships (e.g., a classmate) and with new
acquaintances.

Theoretical contributions

Choosing privacy as a socially mindful behavior. We conceptualized the choice between
transacting privately and publicly as a socially mindful behavior, and in so doing introduce the
construct of social mindfulness to the literature on consumer behavior. Social mindfulness is
about being thoughtful of others and making decisions that are considerate of their needs and
wishes (Van Lange and Van Doesum 2015). We posited that choosing to transact privately
represents a socially mindful behavior, as it preserves partners’ future ability to decide whether
or not to disclose transaction details in the future. In addition, we provided evidence that
demonstrating social mindfulness has important interpersonal benefits. It suggests having
stronger communal traits, drives expectations of behaving cooperatively, and induces
cooperation in others.
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Signaling. We extend the literature on signaling theory by identifying a behavior
consumers can use to communicate owning strong communal traits. Past research has identified
how consumers signal status (Dubois et al. 2012), competence (Bellezza et al. 2014), and
motivation (Cheng et al. 2020). We contribute to this growing body of literature by showing that
choosing to transact privately rather than publicly informs others’ inferences and can be used
intentionally to communicate information about the self. Because the impression one makes can
influence others’ subsequent social behaviors, including cooperation (De Bruin and Van Lange
1999), there is value in knowing how consumers can successfully convey their positive traits to
others.
Behavior on online platforms. Online platforms provide consumers with new
possibilities, such as the option to create an enduring record of their transactions. With these new
possibilities come novel choices, such as that of making one’s transactions private or public. It is
important for consumers to understand the downstream implications of these choices. Past
research has demonstrated that consumer behavior enabled by online platforms can have
negative consequences which consumers do not always anticipate. For example, the ability to
share photos temporarily induces disinhibited photo-taking, which signals having poor judgment
(Hofstetter et al. 2017), and the ability to send exact payments suggests having a transactional
view toward the relationship (Alberhasky and Kumar 2021; Kim, Zhang and Norton 2018).
In contrast, the present research identifies an effective way for consumers to signal
positive information about the self. By choosing private modes of transaction, consumers can
communicate that they possess stronger communal traits. While we investigated the alternative
possibility that transacting publicly might signal possessing negative traits, results did not
support that proposition. In sum, these findings support the view that transacting privately
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confers interpersonal benefits, rather than the view that transacting publicly causes interpersonal
harm or detriment.

Limitations and Future Research

In this work, we have examined how partners respond when initiators send payments of
money either privately or publicly. It remains unclear whether the downstream effects of
choosing private versus public transactions are driven only when payments are sent, or if they
also would emerge when payments are requested. It also remains to be investigated whether
choosing to receive (vs. choosing to send) payments privately versus publicly would have a
different influence on partners’ interpersonal perceptions and behaviors.
At present, we have limited our focus to financial transactions, which we consider
private, given consumers’ tendency to avoid discussing matters related to personal finances (Sun
and Slepian 2020). Yet even a single transaction contains several pieces of information which
might be considered private. For example, the time and date of the transaction, the purpose of the
transaction, the amount of the transaction, and the identity of the partners all could play a role in
influencing whether consumers wish to transact privately or publicly. One limitation of the
present study is that the manipulations implied that the two transaction partners had spent time
together. While we have posited that people are sensitive to having their transactions displayed
publicly because transactions involve money, we cannot rule out the possibility that the desire to
keep transactions private instead stems from an implied expenditure of time. Future research
could isolate expenditures of money versus time, to better understand if one more powerfully
drives consumers’ positive views toward private versus public interaction modes.
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There are additional aspects of P2P payment systems that also could be examined in
future research. For example, researchers could investigate how other behaviors, such as
choosing to use a profile picture or not, influence partners’ perceptions of and behaviors toward
initiators. Alternatively, future research could examine questions related to consumers’ feelings
of connectedness to a P2P payment system. Emerging research suggests that consumers’
connection to financial vehicles can influence purchase experiences (Valenzuela et al. 2021).
Perhaps feelings of connectedness also could influence how consumers interpret others’
behaviors on P2P payment platforms, or affect their own propensity to enact certain behaviors,
such as transacting privately or publicly.
In the present studies, cooperation was studied in the context of economic games, leaving
open the question of how transacting privately or publicly impacts real cooperative behavior in
the home, workplace, or marketplace. It is also unknown how the act of transacting privately or
publicly on multiple occasions might influence the inferences made about initiators, or their
partners’ willingness to cooperate. Emerging research has documented that repeated (vs. onetime) behaviors can distinctly impact others’ impressions (Valsesia and Diehl 2021), suggesting
this may be an aspect of private versus public transactions that merits examination.
Finally, the current research investigated research between consumers, but in some cases,
businesses also utilize P2P payment platforms and can transmit payments to consumers (e.g.,
cash back rewards). While past research has examined the inferences consumers make when
business adopt P2P payment platforms (Huang et al. 2020), future research could examine the
inferences consumers form when businesses choose to transact privately or publicly.

Practical contributions
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P2P payment platforms are used by millions of consumers (Rudegeair 2019) and every
quarter enable transactions totaling in the billions of dollars (de Best 2021). These numbers point
to the growing prevalence of P2P payment apps. Although they are commonly used, consumers
have had little information on how their behaviors on P2P payment platforms might impact their
interpersonal relationships. We sought to provide clarity on this topic by demonstrating the
downstream interpersonal implications of their transaction-related decisions. Consumers, once
equipped with a better understanding of how others view and respond to their behaviors on P2P
payment platforms, might be able to make better-informed decisions.
Our work also has managerial implications. As of now, Venmo sets the default payment
privacy setting to public (Elliot 2018). Consequently, if users begin to use the platform without
changing the default setting, their payments will be sent publicly and may be visible to anyone
on Venmo. The present work suggests that using the default method of transacting can
negatively impact the very social relationships that Venmo serves. Thus, the finding that
choosing to transact privately enhances partners’ willingness to cooperate is one that P2P
payment platforms, and the people who manage them, may be interested to know. In addition,
providing consumer services that encourage consumers to interact privately may represent an
opportunity for business managers to gain a competitive advantage over companies that
encourage more public modes of interacting.

Conclusion
Online, consumers commonly face decisions about whether to keep private or disclose
their interactions with other consumers. We suggest that it may be beneficial to choose privacy
over disclosure, especially when money is involved. Choosing to transact privately represents a
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socially mindful behavior that signals possessing stronger communal traits. Partners expect
private initiators to behave more cooperatively and, in turn, become more willing to cooperate
themselves. On P2P payment platforms, transacting publicly may appear to be the norm – but to
signal positive interpersonal traits and encourage cooperation in others, private transactions work
best.

53

References

Allen, Tim (2013), “Having a CAPTCHA is Killing Your Conversion Rate,”
https://moz.com/blog/having-a-captcha-is-killing-your-conversion-rate.
Alberhasky, Max and Amit Kumar (2021), “A Venmo Effect on Relationships: Electronic
Payment Makes Social Relations More Transactional and Experiences Less Enjoyable,”
paper presented at the Happiness and Well-Being Pre-Conference at the Society for
Personality and Social Psychology Annual Meeting, virtual.
Axelrod, Robert (1980), “Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma,” Journal of conflict
resolution, 24(1), 3-25.
Axelrod, Robert, and William D. Hamilton (1981), “The evolution of cooperation,” science,
211(4489), 1390-96.
Bakan, David (1966), The duality of human existence: An essay on psychology and religion,
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Barlow, David H., Kristen K. Ellard, Shannon Sauer-Zavala, Jacqueline R. Bullis, and Jenna R.
Carl (2014), “The origins of neuroticism,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(5),
481-96.
Batson, C. Daniel (1991), The Altruism Question: Toward A Social-psychological Answer,
Psychology Press.
Baumeister, Roy F. (1982), “A self-presentational view of social phenomena,” Psychological
bulletin, 91(1), 3-26.
Baumeister, Roy F., Kathleen D. Vohs, and David C. Funder (2007), “Psychology as the science

54

of self-reports and finger movements: Whatever happened to actual behavior? ,”
Perspectives on psychological science, 2(4), 396-403.
Bellezza, Silvia, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan (2014), “The red sneakers effect: Inferring
status and competence from signals of nonconformity,” Journal of consumer research,
41(1), 35-54.
Belk, Russell W. (1985), “Materialism: Trait aspects of living in the material world,” Journal of
Consumer research, 12(3), 265-80.
Bem, Daryl J., and Andrea Allen (1974), “On predicting some of the people some of the time:
The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior,” Psychological review, 81(6),
506-20.
Brambilla, Marco, Patrice Rusconi, Simona Sacchi, and Paolo Cherubini (2011), “Looking for
honesty: The primary role of morality (vs. sociability and competence) in information
gathering,” European journal of social psychology, 41(2), 135-43.
Cheng, Yimin, Anirban Mukhopadhyay, and Patti Williams (2020), “Smiling signals intrinsic
motivation,” Journal of Consumer Research, 46(5), 915-935.
Cislak, Aleksandra, and Bogdan Wojciszke (2006), “The role of self-interest and competence in
attitudes towards politicians,” Polish Psychological Bulletin, 37(4), 203–12.
Cislak, Aleksandra, and Bogdan Wojciszke (2008), “Agency and communion are inferred from
actions serving interests of self or others,” European Journal of Social Psychology 38(7),
1103-10.
Corfman, Kim P., and Donald R. Lehmann (1987), “Models of cooperative group decisionmaking and relative influence: An experimental investigation of family purchase
decisions,” Journal of Consumer Research, 14(1), 1-13.

55

Cortez, Joe (2021), “How to Send and Receive Money Using Venmo,”
https://time.com/nextadvisor/credit-cards/venmo-guide/.
Cozby, Paul C. (1973), “Self-disclosure: a literature review,” Psychological bulletin, 79(2), 7391.
Curry, David (2020), “Venmo Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020),”
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/venmo-statistics/.
Curry, David (2022), “Venmo Revenue and Usage Statistics (2022),”
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/venmo-statistics/
de Best, Raynor (2021), “Venmo's total payment volume from 1st quarter 2017 to 4th
quarter 2020,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/763617/venmo-total-paymentvolume.
De Bruin, Ellen NM, and Paul AM Van Lange (1999), “Impression formation and cooperative
behavior,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(2-3), 305-28.
Declerck, Carolyn H., Christophe Boone, and Griet Emonds (2013), “When do people
cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making,” Brain and cognition,
81(1), 95-117.
Deutsch, Morton (1949), "A theory of co-operation and competition," Human relations, 2(2),
129-52.
DeWall, C. Nathan, Laura E. Buffardi, Ian Bonser, and W. Keith Campbell (2011), "Narcissism
and implicit attention seeking: Evidence from linguistic analyses of social networking
and online presentation," Personality and Individual Differences, 51(1). 57-62.
Dubois, David, Derek D. Rucker, and Adam D. Galinsky (2012), “Super size me: Product size as
a signal of status,” Journal of Consumer Research, 38(6), 1047-62.

56

Dzhogleva, Hristina, and Cait Poynor Lamberton (2014), “Should birds of a feather flock
together? Understanding self-control decisions in dyads,” Journal of Consumer Research
41(2), 361-80.
Elliot, Matt (2018), “How to make your Venmo transactions private,”
https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-make-your-venmo-transactions-private/
Epstein, Seymour (1979), “The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of
the time,” Journal of personality and social psychology, 37(7), 1097-1126.
Faul, Franz, Edgar Erdfelder, Albert G. Lang, and Axel Buchner (2007), “G*Power 3: A flexible
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences,”
Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-91.
Frimer, Jeremy A., Lawrence J. Walker, William L. Dunlop, Brenda H. Lee, and Amanda
Riches (2011), “The integration of agency and communion in moral personality:
Evidence of enlightened self-interest,” Journal of personality and social psychology,
101(1), 149-63.
Garbinsky, Emily N., Joe J. Gladstone, Hristina Nikolova, and Jenny G. Olson (2020), "Love,
lies, and money: Financial infidelity in romantic relationships," Journal of Consumer
Research, 47(1), 1-24.
Gil-Lopez, T., Shen, C., Benefield, G. A., Palomares, N. A., Kosinski, M., & Stillwell, D.
(2018), “One size fits all: Context collapse, self-presentation strategies and language
styles on Facebook,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 23(3), 127-145.
Goldberg, Herb, and Robert T. Lewis (2000), Money madness: The psychology of saving,
spending, loving, and hating money, Wellness Institute, Inc.
Goodwin, Cathy (1992), "A conceptualization of motives to seek privacy for nondeviant

57

consumption," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1(3), 261-284.
Gray, Jim (1981), "The transaction concept: Virtues and limitations." In VLDB, 81, 144-54.
Hake, Don F., and Ron Vukelich (1972), “A CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW OF
COOPERATION PROCEDURES 1,” Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior,
18(2), 333-43.
Hayes, Andrew F. (2017), Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process
analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford publications.
Hofstetter, Reto, Roland Rüppell, and Leslie K. John (2017), “Temporary sharing prompts
unrestrained disclosures that leave lasting negative impressions,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 114(45), 11902-07.
Huang, Liang, Anastasiya Pocheptsova Ghosh, Ruoou Li, and Elise Chandon Ince (2020), “Pay
Me with Venmo: Effect of Service Providers’ Decisions to Adopt P2P Payment Methods
on Consumer Evaluations,” Journal of the Association for Consumer Research, 5(3),
271-81.
John, Leslie K., Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein (2011), “Strangers on a plane:
Context-dependent willingness to divulge sensitive information,” Journal of consumer
research, 37(5), 858-73.
Jones, Edward E., and Keith E. Davis (1965), “From acts to dispositions the attribution process
in person perception,” In Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 2, Academic
Press, 219-66.
Jones, Daniel N., and Delroy L. Paulhus (2014), "Introducing the short dark triad (SD3) a brief
measure of dark personality traits," Assessment, 21(1), 28-41.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsc, and Richard H. Thaler (1986), “Fairness and the assumptions

58

of economics,” Journal of Business, 59(4), S285–S300.
Kappes, Heather Barry, Joe J. Gladstone, and Hal E. Hershfield (2021), “Beliefs about whether
spending implies wealth,” Journal of Consumer Research, 48(1), 1-21.
Kelley, Harold H. (1973), "The processes of causal attribution." American psychologist, 28(2),
107-28.
Kim, Tami, Kate Barasz, and Leslie K. John (2021), “Consumer disclosure,” Consumer
Psychology Review, 4(1), 59-69.
Kim, Tami, Ting Zhang, and Michael I. Norton (2019), “Pettiness in social exchange,” Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General 148(2), 361-73.
Krueger, David W. (1991), “Money meanings and madness: A psychoanalytic perspective,”
Psychoanalytic Review, 78(2), 209-24.
Ladley, Daniel, Ian Wilkinson, and Louise Young (2015), “The impact of individual versus
group rewards on work group performance and cooperation: A computational social
science approach,” Journal of Business Research, 68(11), 2412-25.
Larrick, Richard P., and Sally Blount (1997), “The claiming effect: Why players are more
generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 72(4), 810-25.
Leary, Mark R., and Robin M. Kowalski (1990), “Impression management: A literature review
and two-component model,” Psychological bulletin, 107(1), 34-47.
Levine, Emma E., Alixandra Barasch, David Rand, Jonathan Z. Berman, and Deborah A. Small
(2018), “Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 147(5), 702-19.
Lowe, Michael L., and Kelly L. Haws (2014), “(Im) moral support: the social outcomes of

59

parallel self-control decisions,” Journal of Consumer Research 41(2), 489-505.
McCrae, Robert R. (1990), “Controlling neuroticism in the measurement of stress,” Stress
Medicine, 6(3), 237-41.
Mead, Margaret (2002), Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples, Transaction
Publishers.
Melumad, Shiri, and Robert Meyer (2020), “Full disclosure: How smartphones enhance
consumer self-disclosure,” Journal of Marketing, 84(3), 28-45.
Melzner, Johann, Andrea Bonezzi, and Tom Meyvis (2021), “Information Disclosure in the Era
of Voice Technology,” working paper, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York
University, New York, NY 10012.
Milgram, Stanley (1965), “Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority,” Human
relations, 18(1), 57-76.
Nasukawa, Tetsuya and Jeonghee Yi (2003), “Sentiment analysis: Capturing favorability using
natural language processing,” in Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on
Knowledge capture, 70-77.
Nikolova, Hristina, and Cait Lamberton (2016), “Men and the middle: Gender differences in
dyadic compromise effects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 43(3), 355-71.
Nowak, Martin, and Karl Sigmund (1993), “A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms
tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game,” Nature, 364( 6432), 56-8.
Olson, Jenny G., Brent McFerran, Andrea C. Morales, and Darren W. Dahl (2016), “Wealth and
welfare: Divergent moral reactions to ethical consumer choices,” Journal of Consumer
Research 42(6), 879-96.
O’Neil, John R. (1993), The Paradox of Success: When Winning at Work Means Losing at Life,

60

New York, NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum (1957), “The measurement of
Meaning,” No. 47, University of Illinois press.
Petronio, S. (2002). Boundaries of privacy: Dialectics of disclosure. Suny Press.
Pierce, Jon L., Tatiana Kostova, and Kurt T. Dirks (2003), “The state of psychological
ownership: Integrating and extending a century of research,” Review of general
psychology, 7(1), 84-107.
Rand, David G., and Martin A. Nowak (2013), “Human cooperation,” Trends in cognitive
sciences, 17(8), 413-25.
Rosseel, Yves (2012), “lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling,” Journal of
Statistical Software, 48(2), 1–36.
Roth, Yefim, Michaela Wänke, and Ido Erev (2016), “Click or skip: The role of experience in
easy-click checking decisions,” Journal of Consumer Research, 43(4), 583-97.
Rucker, Derek D., Adam D. Galinsky, and Joe C. Magee (2018), “The agentic–communal model
of advantage and disadvantage: How inequality produces similarities in the psychology
of power, social class, gender, and race,” Advances in experimental social psychology,
58, 71-125.
Rudegeair, Peter (2019), “Venmo Has 40 Million Users, Outnumbering Most Big Banks,”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/venmo-has-40-million-users-outnumbering-most-bigbanks-11556142906
Schlenker, Barry R. and Mark R. Leary (1982), “Audiences' reactions to self-enhancing, selfdenigrating, and accurate self-presentations,” Journal of experimental social psychology,
18(1), 89-104.

61

Schnittka, Oliver, Henrik Sattler, and Mario Farsky (2013), “Turning good ideas into bad news:
The effect of negative and positive sponsorship information on sponsors’ brand image,”
Schmalenbach Business Review 65(3), 227-47.
Schurr, Paul H., and Julie L. Ozanne (1985), “Influences on exchange processes: Buyers'
preconceptions of a seller's trustworthiness and bargaining toughness,” Journal of
consumer research, 11(4), 939-53.
Schwartz, Shalom H. (2012), “An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values,” Online
Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1).
Sharot, Tali, and Cass R. Sunstein (2020), "How people decide what they want to know." Nature
Human Behaviour, 4(1), 14-19.
Shevlin, Ron (2019), “Venmo Versus Zelle: Who's Winning The P2P Payments War?”
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/02/11/venmo-versuszelle/?sh=55da34273c62
Snyder, Mark, and William Ickes (1985), “Personality and social behavior,” Handbook of social
psychology, 2(3), 883-947.
Srna, Shalena, Alixandra Barasch and Deborah A. Small (2020), “When Signaling Status
Backfires: How Signals of Self-Interest Undermine Cooperation” [Working Paper], Ross
School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.
Straub, Paul G. and Keith Mirninghan (1995), “An experimental investigation of ultimatum
games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 27(3), 345–64.
Stevens, Jeffrey R., Fiery A. Cushman, and Marc D. Hauser (2005), “Evolving the psychological

62

mechanisms for cooperation,” Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 36,
499-518.
Sun, Katherine Qianwen, and Michael L. Slepian (2020), “The conversations we seek to avoid,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 160, 87-105.
Valenzuela, Ana, Lennay Chapman, Christopher Bechler, Szu-chi Huang, Avni Shah, Xinlong
Li, Shelle Santana, Sara Vera, and Felipe Chacon (2021), "When Cash Is No Longer
King: on the Unintended Consequences of Digital Financial Platforms," in NA Advances in Consumer Research Volume 49, eds. Tonya Williams Bradford, Anat
Keinan, and Matthew Matthew Thomson, Duluth, MN: Association for Consumer
Research, 882-86.
Valsesia, Francesca and Kristin Diehl (2021), “Let Me Show You What I Did Versus What I
Have: Sharing Experiential Versus Material Purchases Alters Authenticity and Liking of
Social Media Users,” Journal of Consumer Research, ucab068.
Van Doesum, Niels J., Dion AW Van Lange, and Paul AM Van Lange (2013), "Social
mindfulness: skill and will to navigate the social world," Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 105(1), 86-103.
Van Lange, Paul AM (1999), “The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: an
integrative model of social value orientation,” Journal of personality and social
psychology, 77(2), 337-49.
Van Lange, Paul AM, and Niels J. Van Doesum (2015), “Social mindfulness and social
hostility,” Current opinion in behavioral sciences 3, 18-24.
Venmo (n.d. a), “Cancel Payment,” https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/235171088-CancelPayment#:~:text=It%20is%20not%20possible%20to,payment%20for%20the%20same%
20amount.
______(n.d. b), “Payment Activity & Privacy,” https://help.venmo.com/hc/enus/articles/210
63

413717-Payment-ActivityPrivacy#:~:text=Hiding%20Your%20Past%20Payments,
we%20 cannot%20undo%20this%20action.
Wallace, Björn, David Cesarini, Paul Lichtenstein, and Magnus Johannesson (2007),
“Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 104(40), 15631-34.
Walter, Tony (1991), “Modern death: taboo or not taboo?,” Sociology, 25(2), 293-310.
Whittaker, Zack (2018), “Venmo has no good reason to make user transactions public by
default,” https://www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/venmo-refuses-to-say-whytransactions-are-public-by-default/.
Wu, Eugenia C., Sarah G. Moore, and Gavan J. Fitzsimons (2019), "Wine for the table: Selfconstrual, group size, and choice for self and others," Journal of Consumer Research,
46(3), 508-27.

64

